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ABSTRACT
Best practices in digital forensics demand the use of write-blockers when creating forensic
images of digital media, and this has been a core tenet of computer forensics training for
decades. The practice is so ingrained that the integrity of images created without a write-blocker
are immediately suspect. This paper describes a research framework that compares forensic
images acquired with and without utilizing write-blockers in order to understand the extent of
the differences, if any, in the resultant forensic copies. We specifically address whether
differences are superficial or evidentiary, and we discuss the impact of admitting evidence
acquired without write blocking. The experiments compare the changes made to a hard drive
and flash drive when imaged and examined with a Windows-based forensics workstation.
Keywords: Digital forensics, computer forensics, write-blocking, forensic image, forensic data
acquisition

1. INTRODUCTION
The first phase of the computer forensics
process - after identifying digital devices that
might have a nexus to an investigation - is
data acquisition. This action includes creating
a forensically correct copy of the desired
media and is typically achieved by obtaining a
bit-stream image of the original data
(Carlton, 2007). This activity is necessary in
order to adhere to the mandate of conducting
a forensic examination on a copy rather than
on the original evidentiary media, where the
copy is presumed to be identical to the
original. Digital forensic examiners typically
perform the imaging process by attaching the
original storage medium (i.e., a hard drive or
an external storage device) to a write-blocker
that is, in turn, attached to a forensic
workstation, and then employing software to
© 2014 ADFSL

create the forensic image. The intent of the
write-blocker is to prevent the forensic
workstation's software or operating system
from making any inadvertent changes to the
original media, including adding, deleting, or
modifying any information (Forensic Focus,
2010; Henry, 2009; Nelson, Phillips, &
Steuart, 2010).
Employing a write-blocker during the
imaging process is so ingrained in our
teaching, education, and practice that there is
no known mention within the literature
addressing the treatment of a forensic copy
that has been made without a write-blocker.
This omission raises many scientific questions:
What happens if a disk or other media is
imaged without benefit of a write-blocker? Is
the copy tainted? If so, what is the extent of
any contamination? Procedurally, if a device
Page 51

JDFSL V9N3
is imaged without a write-blocker, should such
evidence be discarded by an examiner or
investigator, ignored by counsel, or challenged
by the opposing party on the presumption
that the image no longer represents the
original media? If such a generalized objection
were raised, how should a judge know whether
to sustain or overrule the objection, and how
should the party offering such evidence argue
for the evidence's inclusion?
These
questions
are
not
entirely
hypothetical. The current Scientific Working
Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) Best
Practices for Computer Forensics document is
clear that write-blockers should be used
"when possible" (SWGDE, 2013, p. 7)
without mention of the negative impacts of
not using blockers. The Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE) specifically allow duplicates
to be admitted as evidence to the same extent
as the original unless legitimate questions can
be raised as to the veracity of the copy (FRE,
2013). Does the lack of a write-blocker
undermine the veracity of a copy so as to
make it ineffective as evidence?
The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) has detailed specifications
on how to test hardware and software writeblockers to validate their proper operation
(NIST, 2003, 2004, 2005). They do not,
however, describe the impact when writeblockers are not employed. Thus, lack of write
blocking remains a somewhat ambiguous
state.
In U.S. v. Labuda (2012), the only case we
found where write blockers were specifically
cited as an issue, a police forensic examiner
examined a cell phone's memory card without
making an image. While the defense expert
challenged the police examiner's lack of
process by directly examining the card, the
evidence was nevertheless allowed. But the
write-blocker was not a central point of the
case and, therefore, this case does not appear
to sufficiently answer the questions above.
The study described in this paper includes
experiments to test the scientific foundation
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behind the requirement to use write blockers
and the assertion of their necessity. The
testing framework is presented below in
section 2. In section 3 of this paper, we
discuss the results of our examination
comparing images acquired with writeblockers to those acquired without writeblockers. Lastly, in section 4, we offer our
conclusions.

2. TESTING
FRAMEWORK
2.1 Test Philosophy
Write blockers are used in digital forensic
imaging based upon the hypothesis that
changes will occur to the source media if write
blockers are not employed. For testing
purposes, the null hypothesis is that no
changes will occur to the source media if a
write blocker is not used. The authors
designed a test framework in an attempt to
test the null hypothesis, or to measure the
amount of changes, if any, made to digital
media during the process of making a
forensically correct copy (i.e., a bit-stream
image). The framework was necessary in order
to ensure that the experiments are repeatable
and reproducible. In this context, repeatable
means that we can get the same result over
and over, and reproducible means that other
researchers can get the same results following
our framework. Or, in the words of NIST
(2001):
... repeatability is defined as the
ability to get the same test results on
the same testing environment (same
computer, disk, mode of operation,
etc.). Reproducibility is defined as the
ability to get the same test results on
a
different
testing
environment
(different PC, hard disk, operator,
etc.). (p. 7)
The
universe
of
possible
testing
environments is actually quite huge. As Lyle
(2012) observes, there are many choices of
(Figure 1):
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•

Digital media storage technology (e.g.,
traditional spinning disk or flash/solidstate devices)

•

File system type (e.g., FAT12/16/32,
NTFS,
HFS/HFS+,
ext2/ext3/ext4,
EXFAT, etc.)

•

Interface between digital media and
forensic workstation (e.g., Firewire, IDE,
SATA, SCSI, USB)

•

Forensic workstation operating system
(e.g., Windows, Mac OS X, Unix, Linux)

•

Write-blocker type (e.g., the variety of
software and hardware products)

•

Imaging software (e.g., dcfldd, dd,
EnCase, FTK Imager, X-Ways Forensics)
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and hardware (e.g., Forensic Duplicator,
Forensic Imager, Hardcopy, Shadow)
•

Analysis software (e.g., Autopsy/TSK,
EnCase, FTK, ProDiscover, X-Ways
Forensics)

The non-exhaustive list above represents a
subset of the variables and the options
available, but even these represent more than
5,000 configurations. Given the size of the test
universe, we selected a small subset of media
and designed a testing framework as a
demonstration of possible further work.
However, our media subset represents two of
the most commonly used devices at the time
of our study (i.e., a SATA hard disk and a
USB flash drive).

Figure 1. A subset of forensic imaging variables.
ext - Extended File System (Linux); exFAT - Extended File Allocation Table (Microsoft).
FAT - File Allocation Table (Microsoft); FTK - Forensic Toolkit (AccessData).
HFS - Hierarchical File System (Apple); IDE - Integrated Drive Electronics (Western Digital).
NTFS - New Technology File System (Microsoft); SATA - Serial Advanced Technology Attachment.
SCSI - Small Computer System Interface; TSK - The Sleuth Kit.
USB - Universal Serial Bus.
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2.2 Test Design
As mentioned above, NIST
(2003, 2004,
2005) has detailed functional and test plan
specifications for hardware and software write
blockers. The tests described here are not as
thorough as the NIST tests because the point
is not to validate functioning write blockers
but to determine what changes occur on the
target medium when write blockers are
absent, either because they were never used or
later found to be non-functional.
The
general
straightforward:

testing

process

is

1. Prepare known data sets and write them
to verified wiped storage devices.
2. Take a bit-stream image of the storage
device
attached
to
the
forensic
workstation with a hardware writeblocker.
3. Take a bit-stream image of the storage
device
attached
to
the
forensic
workstation via the Universal Serial Bus
(USB) port and a software write-blocker.
4. Take a bit-stream image of the storage
device
attached
to
the
forensic
workstation via the USB port without use
of either a hardware or software writeblocker.
5. Document hash value findings.

2.3 Test Sets
This project tested two different media types,
namely, a hard disk drive (HDD) and a USB
flash drive (also commonly known as a thumb
drive). Two different test data sets were
created, one for each device. Each test set had
a valid file system and typical set of files in
allocated and unallocated space, as an
example of something that might be found in
the field.
The first media item was an 80 GB SATA
Seagate ST380815AS hard drive. The drive
was wiped to an all-zero state using the builtin wiping function of EnCase. The wiped hard
drive was then connected to a computer in
order to install the Windows 7 Professional
(32-bit version) operating system using the
Page 54

NTFS file system; default settings were
accepted and all Windows drivers were
installed. Microsoft Office 2010 was then
installed; normal Office documents, including
a mix of Word documents and Excel
spreadsheets, were then written to the drive.
Finally, the test team visited several typical
Web sites such as asrock.com, bing.com,
google.com,
msn.com,
newegg.com,
windows.microsoft.com, and yahoo.com. This
collection of information was designated HDD
Data Set 0.
The second media item was an 8 GB
Kingston USB flash drive. The flash drive was
attached to the forensic workstation and a full
format performed from the Windows
operating system, employing the FAT32 file
system. A variety of files and documents were
then copied to the drive, including a mix of
Word documents, Excel documents, Microsoft
OneNote files, Adobe Portable Document
Format (PDF) files, PowerPoint files, and
several image files. The flash drive was then
properly
ejected
from
the
forensic
workstation. This collection of information
was designated USB Data Set 0.

2.4 Image Creation
Three bit-stream forensic images were
acquired from each of the media items. In
general, Image 0 (which served as the control
set) was acquired using a hardware writeblocker, Image 1 was acquired using software
write blocking, and Image 2 was acquired
without a write-blocker. All images were
created using EnCase software.
Hardware
write
blocking
employed
Tableau Forensic Bridges, described in more
detail below. The Tableau hardware writeblock capabilities were validated prior to our
tests.
Software write blocking was accomplished
by setting the Windows Registry key
controlling the write status of the USB port,
namely
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\
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CurrentControlSet
\Control\StorageDevicePolicies\WriteProtect.
Setting this Registry key's value to 0x0 allows
writing to the USB port and a value of 0x1
disables writing. After making any change to
the Registry key's value, the system was
rebooted and the appropriate functionality
verified.

3. TESTS AND RESULTS
3.1 Imaging and Hashes
The SATA hard drive was connected to the
forensic workstation's USB port using a
Tableau T35e Forensic SATA/IDE Bridge.
The T35e can operate with the write-block
mode either ON or OFF; the write-blocking
functionality was confirmed prior to running
the tests.
Image 0 was obtained by turning ON the
write-block function of the T35e bridge.
EnCase was used to acquire the image,
producing both Message Digest #5 (MD5)
and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) hashes
(Table 1).
Image 1 was obtained by turning OFF the
write-block function on the bridge and,
instead, setting the Windows registry key to
write-block the USB port. After changing the
Registry key, the forensic workstation was
rebooted
and
the
USB
write-block
functionality was tested prior to attaching the
drive to the workstation. The image was
acquired and hash values calculated using
EnCase.
Image 2 was obtained by turning OFF the
write-block function of the bridge and leaving
the Windows registry key related to the USB
port's write capability at its normal setting.
After changing the keys, the forensic
workstation was rebooted and the USB writeenable capability was tested. The image was
acquired and hash values calculated using
EnCase.

© 2014 ADFSL

JDFSL V9N3
Table 1
HDD Image Hash Values
HDD Image 0 (hardware write-blocker)
MD5

F8BE2078382A68ADC792B734FFB480CD

SHA-1 23812B61A41E01F61AF0DA048B80AD25F1D4C8BA
HDD Image 1 (software write-blocker)
MD5

F8BE2078382A68ADC792B734FFB480CD

SHA-1 23812B61A41E01F61AF0DA048B80AD25F1D4C8BA
HDD Image 2 (no write-blocker)
MD5

CF4539F0E98E67F368E5EB1D3119EB03

SHA-1 31CE3038803A8B4BE39FD197905123664C5C2C5C

Image 0 of the USB flash drive was
obtained by connecting the device to the
forensic workstation's USB port using a
Tableau T8 Forensic USB Bridge in writeblocker
mode.
The
write-blocking
functionality was confirmed prior to running
the tests. EnCase was used to acquire the
image, producing both MD5 and SHA-1
hashes (Table 2).
Image 1 was obtained by plugging the
flash drive directly into the USB port of the
forensic workstation, after setting the
Windows registry key to write-block the USB
port. After changing the Registry key, the
forensic workstation was rebooted and the
USB write-block functionality was tested prior
to plugging the flash drive into the
workstation. The image was acquired and
hash values calculated using EnCase.
Image 2 was obtained by plugging the
flash drive directly into the USB port of the
forensic workstation, leaving the Windows
registry key related to the USB port's write
capability at its normal setting. After
changing the key, the forensic workstation
was rebooted and the USB write-enable
capability was tested prior to plugging the
flash drive into the workstation. The image
was acquired and hash values calculated using
EnCase.
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Table 2
USB Image Hash Values
USB Image 0 (hardware write-blocker)
MD5

1571CFD2F1B5E9F00FAAFCC266C85EE0

SHA-1 7EE9467068D99795A43699B7E5CBDC53A7EA55EC
USB Image 1 (software write-blocker)
MD5

1571CFD2F1B5E9F00FAAFCC266C85EE0

SHA-1 7EE9467068D99795A43699B7E5CBDC53A7EA55EC
USB Image 2 (no write-blocker)
MD5

1571CFD2F1B5E9F00FAAFCC266C85EE0

SHA-1 7EE9467068D99795A43699B7E5CBDC53A7EA55EC

Image 2 and Images 0/1. First, Image 2
contained an extra file, C\System Volume
Information\MountPointManagerRemoteData
base that was not present on Images 0/1.
Second, 358 individual files hashes were
different on Image 2 compared to Images 0/1.
It is noteworthy that all but one of the
changed hashes were assigned to folders that
generally do not have hashes; the one
modified file was D\$Extend\$UsnJrnl·$J,
which is a file that records when and what
modifications are made to files and folders
within Windows.

3.3 USB Flash Drive Results
3.2 HDD Results
As the information in Table 1 shows, the
hardware and software write-blocking function
worked equally well in this test, in that the
hash values of both Image 0 and Image 1 of
the HDD matched. The hash value of Image 2
(no write blocking) differed, indicating that
there were differences between that image and
the write-blocked images.
Subsequent examination of the image files
showed a number of differences between

As the information in Table 2 shows, all of
the images of the flash drive yielded the same
hash value. The individual file hashes were
also examined to verify that there were no
discrepancies.

3.4 Test Universe and Summary
Table 3 summarizes the test scenario in terms
of forensic variables and parameters (based on
Figure 1) and the results reported above

Table 3
Test Universe and Result Summary
Hard Disk Drive

Flash Drive

Device
Interface

SATA

USB

File System

NTFS

FAT32

Workstation
OS

Windows 7

Forensic
Software

Encase
Image 0

Connection
Write-block
Hash (MD5)
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Image 1

Image 2

SATA Bridge to USB
Hardware

Software

F8BE...80CD

Image 0

Image 1

USB Bridge to USB
None

CF45...EB03

Hardware

Image 2

USB port
Software

None

1571...5EE0
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As noted earlier in this paper, there are so
many choices and options in the test
parameters that our study cannot be used to
draw overly generalized conclusions (Lyle,
2012). The test cases do, however, provide a
framework for further research.

4. CONCLUSION
This study examined two imaging scenarios
testing the results of imaging without a write
blocker. In one case, no changes occurred to
evidentiary media; in the second case, only
minimal changes were made but not to user
files where probative information - both
incriminating and exculpatory - is likely to be
found. Since the study looked at only two out
of thousands of possible scenarios, additional,
deeper studies with other devices and
configurations are certainly in order so that a
better understanding can be gained about the
broad impact of inoperable or failed writeblockers.
It is also interesting to address the
concept of repeatability in conducting forensic
data acquisitions in the absence of writeblockers. While two forensic images acquired
from the same original media without use of a
write-blocker will likely yield different hash
values (i.e., digital signatures), this difference
alone does not preclude a scientifically
repeatable finding. Even with the different
media hash values and differences in system
attributes (such as last accessed date),
repeatable findings remain intact for the
content of stored files, file slack, the
overwhelming majority of unallocated space,
and unused space. In fact, the individual hash
values of stored files remain identical when
the images are compared. Therefore, a forensic
examiner may present evidence of data
contained within a stored file or the file slack
associated with the file, and another forensic
examiner will be able to duplicate these
findings even if both examiners created images
from the original media without using writeblockers. The important lesson to learn is that
differences in media hash values do not, by
themselves, imply contamination of data.
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The intent of this study is not to suggest
that the use of write-blockers is unnecessary
but rather to test the assertion that the
absence of effective write blocking causes
insurmountable challenges to the veracity and value - of digital evidence. While our test
results show that some changes are made to
digital media when write-blocking is not
employed (or, presumably, when a writeblocker fails), they also show that the original
evidence is not tainted beyond use and,
certainly, no additional content has been
added to the medium. Thus, the results
suggest, if a party objects to the introduction
of a forensic image solely because of the lack
of write-blocking, the burden of proof is on
the objector to show how the value of the
evidence has been diminished.
This study is intended to help inform the
dialogue about what is and is not best
practices in digital forensics. There are many
cases when write-blocking cannot be
effectively used when analyzing or examining
digital media - such as is sometimes the case
with mobile devices, or when collecting
volatile data or random access memory
(RAM) - and practitioners need to understand
the true impact of the absence of write
blocking so that we can better defend our
processes and examinations.
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